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Introduction
Over the past decade especially, many writers have emphasised the need for a broad approach to the subject of comparative law, thereby moving it beyond the law as rules approach of traditional legal doctrine. It is becoming steadily apparent that comparatists cannot limit themselves to simply comparing rules. The law as rules approach has to be placed in a much wider context. Broader investigation reveals that it is not even rules which are at the core of the comparative endeavour, it is rather the legal discourse, the way lawyers work with the law and reason about it.
The more modest approach of present comparative law limits the context to the function of the law. This functional approach has most prominently been advocated by Zweigert and However, the following question arises wbich we attempt to deal with in the course of this article: can comparative law be fundamentally different from traditional legal doctrine ?
Describing and understanding the rules of one legal system should, in principle, be very similar to describing and understanding the rules of two or more legal systems. While the comparison, as such, is different from what is normally being done in legal doctrine, the reconstruction of legal materials compared, is essentially the same kind of work in both legal doctrine and in comparative law. If understanding law implies much more when studying a foreign legal system compared to the study of the domestic legal system, it means that there are many elements which are implicitly and unconsciously determining the way law is perceived, interpreted and applied in one's own legal system as well. If we can discover such elements, then we may well be moving towards a complete agenda for comparative law.
Moreover, this is also valid the other way around: comparative law makes us aware of the elements which are influencing the law at all levels, it confronts us with our own hidden conceptual, ideological framework. Obvious things then become less obvious, once we realise that they might be completely different elsewhere. Hidden understandings are uncovered when we try to find out why foreign legal rules, approaches, and the like are different from ours.
Comparative law forces us to reflect upon our own legal system, on the 'law as rules' approach, on our own legal practice, on our own legal tradition, on our own legal education.
It makes us asking what exactly determines law, what is essential to law and what is not. In
order to compare legal systems we have to know what it is that makes a number of legally relevant elements to form a 'legal system'. If we want to bring together some 'similar' legal systems and distinguish them from other, 'different' ones, we have to know which kind of similarities and differences may be considered to be paradigmatical to legal systems and which ones are only casual, and of secondary importance.
Comparative law, when carried out imaginatively, compels us to consider a number of fundamental questions, some of which have already been considered in the field of legal theory for many years. Legal theory has the potential to offer some building blocks which could be of use for comparative law. Comparatists may benefit from such legal theoretical insights, which may themselves prove useful in solving some of the current problems of comparative law.
In a recent article, published under the heading 'Comparative Law and Legal Theory' John BELL shows that comparative law has lessons for legal theory 10 . This article in turn hopes to show that theoretical insights are essential for the development of comparative law. In this article we hope to consider what the building blocks for a theory of comparative law may be and their articulation.
Legal Cultures

John BELL defines legal culture as "a specific way in which values, practices, and concepts are integrated into the operation of legal institutions and the interpretation of legal texts"
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. The concept of legal culture emphasises that law is more than just a set of rules or concepts. It is also a social practice within a legal community. It is this social practice which is determining the actual meaning of the rules and concepts, their weight, their implementation, and their role in society. However, if law is not just a set of rules or concepts, it is neither an isolated social practice. Law and legal practice are one aspect of the culture to which they belong. 'Legal cultures' are part of more general cultures.
Understanding law implies a knowledge and an understanding of the social practice of its legal community. Understanding this social practice presupposes a knowledge and an understanding of the ge-neral culture of the society in which the legal community is embedded. Distinguishing legal systems means distinguishing legal communities and legal cultures.
Comparing and dis-tinguishing legal families is only possible when locating these legal orders and legal cultures within the broader context of the societal culture to which they belong. If we want to distin-guish legal families, it would seem wise to have a brief overview of the cultural families in the world. What follows represents a brief (albeit inevitably reductionist) attempt to outline some elements of Western and other non Western legal cultures which may contribute to the chosen approach to the subject matter.
Traditionnally, when distinguishing different legal cultures in the world two approaches prevail, depending upon the context.
Legal Families
In comparative law, in the second half of twentieth century three main 'legal families' were distinguished, from a western point of view: the Romano-Germanic family, the Common Law family and the 'Socialist' family. Although some different 'legal culture' was recognised in non-western societies, it could easily be upheld that most of them belonged, at least to some extent, to one of the major western legal families. Most African countries, after decoloni-zation, have, to a large extent, kept the European law imported by their colonial rulers. Their private laws are, at least formally, still ruled by the Code Napoléon or by the Common Law. All Asian countries ruled by a communist government could easily be classified under the 'socialist family'. Countries like Japan or Turkey had used the German civil code as a model for their own civil code. India, Australia, New-Zealand and other Commonwealth countries were classified under the 'Common Law' family. Actually, only the islamic countries could not really be considered to belong to one of those western legal families.
Things were both simplified and complicated around 1990, when the communist regimes in all European and in several Asian countries collapsed: the 'socialist family' suddenly disappeared. From a western perspective only two main legal families remained: the Romano-germanic one and the Common Law.
12 At first sight comparative law seemed to be simplified. At a second sight, however, it was somewhat embarrassing to see how a pure political change, affecting only public law directly, could make a private law family to disappear at once. In a more critical approach, one had to ask whether it did not mean that something was wrong with the traditional legal family classification as such. After all, today nobody denies that most Central and Eastern European private law systems belong to the same Roman law tradition as the other European legal systems. Actually, Continental
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Hein KÖTZ, in his foreword to the 1996 edition of his Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung (with Konrad ZWEIGERT), enthusiastically writes that, following the collapse of the Soviet communism and the almost complete disappearance of the 'socialist legal family' in the world, this edition could be reduced by 60 pages (see at p.v).
Western European legal systems are closer to them than they are to the English private law. If this common legal tradition had been interrupted for (hardly) a few decades, it is not because private law changed fundamentally, but because traditional areas of private law were taken over by public law during that period. Allthough there are important gaps in these legal systems, because of the standstill of the development of private law over more than fourty years, it is relatively easy to link up with European legal tradition. The vacuum in private law makes it even easier to adapt to recent changes in European law, than it appears to be for the EU countries themselves.
So, rather than simplifying the comparative work, these changes have challenged our traditional conceptual framework of 'legal families in the world'.
Moreover, current changes in the European Common Law countries, mainly under the influence of European law, are bringing these legal systems gradually closer to the Continental European legal systems and little by little further from their Common Law family members.
Until recently major differences in Europe between Common law and Civil law systems lie in the field of legal sources (codified law vs. judge made law) and of legal methodology (no use of travaux préparatoires).
As regards the role of the judge, even in codified legal systems 13 the major role of courts is commonly accepted, and in many countries this has been the case already for a long time.
Both through legal practice and legal doctrine, decisions of higher courts, and certainly of supreme courts, are considered to contain new, general rules, that have to be followed just as This is the current state of affairs in the traditional 'law as rules' approach of comparative law. The fact that the whole main 'legal families' division is now collapsing is probably only partially due to external developments. It is doubtful whether the traditional 'law as rules' approach is able to offer any sound basis for 'legal family' classifications.
Cultural Families
However, there has been over the last century another approach in distinguishing legal cultures in the world: the sociological or anthropological one. Here, 'law as rules' never has been at the core of the research, but rather the attitudes towards law and the imbedment of law in society and in its general culture. It is this approach which seems to be essential to start with, if one wants to develop a general framework for comparative law at world level. Inevitably, our approach will still be based on a western concept of law, but so has even been the legal education of lawyers in most non western countries Rationalism means the belief in the infinite possibilities available to the human spirit to know, structure and master reality in an objective manner. This conception is opposed to irrationalism where the belief is in a preponderance of sentiment and metaphysical elements, in order to know, structure and master reality. The most opposite to rationalism are the legal systems which are directly based on religion, such as the Islamic or Hindu legal systems.
Western Individualism has been a feature of the development of western society.
Ideas formulated and pursued during the time of the Roman Empire relied on distinct notions of individualism. Such notions were developed under the influence of Greek philosophy and the need to construct a liberal economy in the vast territory which was the Roman Empire.
Belief in Christianity with a God, who is all powerful and personified, who creates man in his own image, also influenced this belief in Individualism. Christian doctrine also allowed a Two branches of this social law were developed: Social security and Labour law. Social security, instead of being a legally organised form of social solidarity, has been developed as a system of individual social insurance covering individual risks such as illness, unemployment etc. In Labour law also, the protection of individual interests of the worker dominates, and not the collective interests of the group of workers. New belief in the infinite possibilities of the human spirit to experience reality, to master and organise it, originally manifested in the Renaissance, then in the French philosophy of the 18th century, and also to some extent in German idealist philosophy (HEGEL). The rapid increase of scientific, technical and industrial development in the following centuries, is both an application and a result of this belief. The success of science, technology and industry has, in an inverse way, increased the belief in the value of the human mind, which in turn has also had an equal influence on science. This was not only in the positive sciences, but also in the human sciences as it resulted in the development of new disciplines such as econometrics and formal logic. As a reaction to all this, different forms of ideas came into being in which irrational elements played a large role, for example in phenomenology and hermeneutics, but they had only a limited influence on Western culture. Individualist rights are considered to be contrary to that natural order. The individual has no rights but only duties towards the others and towards society. When using his individual rights, the individual, wrongly, opposes himself to the society. By claiming his rights he is damaging society with his combative attitude. Therefore, conflicts are preferably not brought before the court, but solved through reconciliation 29 . If there is a trial, than one has to make reciprocal concessions, so that the trial can, eventually, be terminated amicably.
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In short, we may conclude that Asian legal culture, when interpreted from an (overtly)
Western point of view, can be represented to a certain extent as being irrational, because of the important role of morals, of religion and of the Confucianist conception of the natural order of things. Oriental people likewise may well consider the western people to be much too rational: as caught in their own mind and in their rational concepts, they have lost all contact with the universe which is surrounding them, and they have lost the consciousness of their place in this universe.
Moreover, Asian legal culture can be perceived as being collectivist. This appears from the absence of the concept of individual rights and in the subordination of the individual to the community. Belonging to a community (company, university, sportsclub, and the like) is more important than the individual position and the individual rights . 31 The collective responsibility for faults and crimes provides an example of the implementation of this conception.
B. Islamic legal culture
29
The Japanese do not bring an action easily. In traditional Korea a yangban (member of the ruling class), who was in mourning (which often lasted for a period of three years) was punished if he came personally to the court to institute a lawsuit, and his suit would not even be received (see: gives it also a less rationalistic basis.
C. African legal culture
The Western conception of the law as a weapon available for the individual against the others and against society, does not fit well with African culture, where the law is rather a means of protection within, and thanks to society. Traditional African legal thinking is not individualistic.
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The way a trial is organised concerns the whole community, both as regards its content and its form. When someone is summoned before court by a person alien to the community As DEKKERS has noted, in 1970: "The Bantou is not an individualist like the European. What would be the fate of the individual in Africa, left to his own devices, without the support of the applied sciences ? At the risk of dying, he has to be member of a group, his family, his tribe, in order to defend himself against nature." (DEKKERS, R., Discours Rectoraux, 1970, p.19) (family, clan, tribe, or the whole society), a reaction of defense and protection will ensue in this community, protecting he who is being attacked. In each trial there is a large audience.
Rituals and palavers play an important role. Arbitration and mutual concessions are, as in Asian legal culture, more important than obtaining one's formal 'rights'
36
.
In Africa law is not separated from religion and morals. The pressure of religion and morals is at least as strong as the coercion of the law, notwithstanding the absence of sanctions.
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Not following the rules of a community indeed means placing oneself outside this community, which may lead to exclusion.
African legal culture appears as neither individualistic, nor rationalist. Law is not conceived as a rational system of strict rules, but rather as a means of social control in order to keep or to restore peace within a community. The solution in a concrete case will rather be guided by this general function of the law than by the strict rule as such. There is no room in an African society for the application of the maxim 'summum ius, summa iniuria'. 
Intra-cultural and Cross-cultural Comparison
There appears to be a basic difference between these four legal cultures as regards the concept of law, the role of law in society and the way conflicts could and should be handled.
In essence, these differences are so fundamantal that there is not so much to be gained by undertaking a superficial comparison by merely comparing legal rules, legal institutions, or even whole branches of legal systems belonging to the different cultural families. As Alan WATSON remarks: "except where the systems are closely related, the differences in legal values may be so extreme as to render virtually meaningless the discovery that systems have the same or a different rule". There is therefore an obvious all-important limitation to the influence of Western culture.
Comparative law, when viewed in its narrowest sense appears only to be feasible (in terms of the aims and objectives it can pursue) within one and the same cultural family sharing a basic common conception of law.
At least some comparatists, such as KAMBA, appear to be aware of the categorical differences when making the distinction between intra-cultural and cross-cultural He emphasises that: "The technique employed must necessarily vary to a considerable extent according to the degree of disparity or similarity in the socio-cultural foundations of the legal orders being compared." 43 . KAMBA, however, seems to think that we are faced with a gradual difference only; he appears unaware of its fundamental, categorical nature. This leads obviously to a complete Press, 1974, p.5. 40 In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be emphasised that the use of the concept legal anthropology has nothing to do with some western ethnocentricity. It simply points to the fact that a broad sociological comparison has to be the first step in any such comparison, and that societies, traditions, world views have to be compared and not legal rules, concepts, institutions, isolated from this broad anthropological context. "An important result of this is that a comparative lawyer must, to a considerable degree rely upon his individual judgment in deciding how to go about the comparison. ... However, it is important to recognise that it is not possible, nor would it be prudent to attempt to prescribe specific comparative procedures to be followed."
44 .
However, it indeed is possible to prescribe specific comparative procedures to be follo- Be it only by the way judges look at those rules, read them and interpret them in their own world view, by the way citizens look at the statutory law and at court decisions and the meaning they confer upon them. Moreover, the role of (statutory) law in society may be much weaker than it is in the West. Custom might play a more decisive role than statutory law. Social rules might effectively prohibit people in practice from making a legal claim, or even using a court decision which accepted such a claim.
Therefore it does not make any sense to look at 'law' in a legal order, that belongs to another cultural family, if this takes place from the point of view, and within the framework, Becoming aware of some of these fundamental cultural differences goes against the nineteenth century belief -still alive in twentieth century be it in different forms -in the possibility of finding some kind of basic set of legal concepts, legal rules and legal institutions that would be common to all legal systems in the world.
The aim of comparative law as a worldwide legal dicipline was advocated in the early years of the development of comparative law as a discipline in its own right. Raymond SALEILLES maintained that comparative law is a science whose object is the discovery of concepts and principles common to all 'civilised' systems of law, that is to say, universal cultural families it should be clear that a belief in the possibility of finding some kind of 'droit idéal relatif' or 'empirical natural law' appears at present to be rather naive and never will be able to achieve any concrete result. Moreover, such observations also serve to weaken attempts to make 'world encyclopedias of law', describing within one and the same (western) framework the law in countries all over the world. One may ask how it is possible to make an international overview of 'contract law', when some problems happen to be solved under contract law in some countries, but under tort law in other ones ? How is it possible to describe the concrete interpretation and adjudication of the western concept of human rights in legal orders all over the world, when one is not aware of the fundamentally different approach to these rights in the various different legal cultures ? 48 It does not make much sense to simply compare the technical rules within the realm of divorce between, e.g., a
European and an Islamic legal system, if one is not aware of the fact that the same problem can be solved in the one country by marrying a second wife, without needing to divorce from the first one, or that the man can simply repudiate his wife, with consequences which are comparable to a divorce in the other country. It is even more problematic to make a cross- the results of such a research, at least some legal theoretical research may be able to offer us some elements, that may prove useful in analysing such legal cultures, and which could be used as a tool for comparative research.
In the philosophy of science, Thomas KUHN developed the concept of 'paradigm', which refers, amongst others, to the hard core of scientific theories
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. It is the common framework within which theories are developed and scientific discussions are pursued. It implies a common scientific language, a common set of concepts, and a common basic world view. If one does not accept the commonly used concepts and/or the commonly accepted ideology, it is no longer possible to develop theories within that science as it has been traditionnally conceived. Sometimes this deviant scientific behaviour attains a notable measure of success.
This can be perceived as being the start of a 'scientific revolution', such as, e.g., the
Copernican revolution, when it got accepted that the sun, and not the earth, is the centre of our solar system. Note that the Copernican theory is already incorporated in our language, as we talk of a 'solar' system rather than of a 'planetary' system, and we do not use at all the word 'earth system'.
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Within legal theory some attention has been paid to the concept of paradigm , be it roughly limited to theories and concepts, a common language, a common methodology. Or, to put it differently:
a common legal culture within some legal community. Such a common legal culture includes shared understandings on, at least, the following points: "For instance, the judgments of the German administrative courts are much richer in factual detail than the judgments of the Bundesgerichtshof though, if anything, the narrative is even drier! .
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All this says nothing about common or different history, or socio-economic conditions, about the content of the law, the legal principles, rules, concepts, or institutions. On one hand, it means that we have a tool for comparing legal systems, without having to take into account the concrete content of the law, nor the social and historical factors which are influencing and co-determining this content. On the other hand, it means that we still have a lot more potential elements at our disposal for comparing and distinguishing legal systems.
Legal systems may have different hierarchies of legal sources, different approaches to statutory interpretation, different styles of drafting judicial decisions, and differences in the legal technique and the legal concepts used, and yet still have basically the same methodology of legal reasoning and legal argumentation and even the same practical result.
On the other hand, within one and the same legal system interpretations and reasonings followed by courts may diverge to such an extent as to reach completely opposite results. A nice example is given by the field of obligations, in the case where the cohabitee stands as surety for the debts of the other cohabitee. This example shows how relative apparent paradigmatical identities and differences may be for the concrete outcome of a trial. It transpires that there are opposite views amongst the different German courts and amongst the different English courts, whereas several decisions of these courts offer a very similar reasoning and outcome, when compared to decisions in the other country. The problem the courts have had to face was that of the position of a cohabitee, generally the wife, of a debtor who had taken a loan from a bank, for which the cohabitee stood as surety. When the main debtor could not pay the debt, the bank made a claim to the cohabitee, who argued that she was not aware of what she signed, and/or that she was put under heavy pressure by her husband, so that the contract on the basis of which she stood as a surety was void.
At first sight this seems to be a relatively easy case, both under English and German law. ). According to the Court of Appeal, "if a wife signs a security document at her debtor husband's request the creditor will be unable to enforce the security unless either the debtor or the creditor has taken positive steps to try and ensure that the wife understands the import of the security documents or unless she has obtained independent advice" influence. This moves the burden of proof to the 'stronger party', who has to show evidence that there was no undue influence. The Bank was made liable on the basis of the doctrine of notice. The House of Lords considered it the duty of the creditor to inquire and to inform the cohabitee: the creditor has to take "reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the surety entered into the obligation freely and in knowledge of the true facts" and to "warn the surety (at a meeting not attended by the principal debtor) of the amount of her potential liability and of the risks involved and advise the surety to take independent legal advice" 59. Again: this amounts to substantive autonomy and not just formal autonomy. While the wording is different to that used by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the content in essence is the same.
And, the difference in wording is primarily due to the different role of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht as a constitutional court, on one hand, and of the House of Lords as a supreme court with much more power to decide the case in the most desirable way, on the other. What is also interesting to consider is that the difference in wording highlights how different courts use the legal concepts, rules, precedents, and the like, which are available within their legal system, in order to make the decision fit with it.
This example shows how similarities and differences at the level of (national) legal culture do not necessarily mean similarities or differences at the level of the actual legal regulation within a broader legal culture, such as the European one. We may conclude that point (f) (a common ideology) in the above given list of paradigmatical theories which are identifying a 'legal system', is the most important one, and 
What is law ?
If we want to compare 'legal systems' we need to look at the differing definitions of law which are offered to us by comparative law. Comparative law, until now has implicitly limited the concept of law to the legal systems of 'nation states'. This approach has rightly been criticised, mainly by legal sociolofgists and legal anthropologists, because it does not take into account different forms of 'unofficial' law. As an alternative a model of 'legal pluralism' is proposed. This pluralist model, however, is challenging the implicit concept of law, which is underlying most comparative research.
Most comparatists, like national doctrinal legal writers, arguably, do not appear to be overly concerned about a definition of law. To a certain extent they are right not to be too This ensures that we do not have to bother about other elements, as, e.g., efficiency, morality, the existence of some State power backing the legal system, etc... It does not follow that those characteristics may not be important in another context, we merely do not raise them in defining 'law'. However, if such a union of primary and secondary rules suffices as being a 'legal system', it follows, not only that legal systems which are considered to be immoral, such as Nazi-law, or legal systems which have a weak efficiency, such as international law, are 'really' law, but also that 'folk law' and various not State-linked organisations, such as churches or sports organisations may be considered to be a 'legal system' in their own right. It entails legal pluralism, also for comparative law.
HART, however, failed to consider another element, which should, in our opinion, be viewed to be essential for considering legal systems to be 'full legal systems': the development of a legal doctrine. This point will be developed in the next chapter.
Moreover, we are here only concerned with a formal definition of 'law'. In this case, however, the formal structure of legal rules, legal procedures and legal institutions are only one part of the story. As emphasised above, law is made daily and developed in legal practice, which in its turn is embedded in a legal culture. Comparative law is not a comparison of static, formal legal systems, it should take into account legal practice and legal culture.
But, as a tool for identifying and comparing legal systems the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' rules is another useful element, besides the distinction between the rationalist and irrationalist approach and between the individualist and collectivist approach, which are distinguishing a 'Western' legal culture from non-Western legal cultures, and besides the analysis of paradigmatical theories, which make it possible to identify 'legal families' within a broader 'legal cultural family'.
A comparison at the level of secondary rules offers a picture of the formal structure of the law, whereas at the level of the 'primary rules' it is the rules of behaviour, the legal rules in the narrow sense, which are compared.
Legal systems with differing rules of behaviour may well share similar formal rules, for instance as related to the way legal rules are created, changed and abolished.
Legal systems sharing similar or even identical primary rules of behaviour may show important differences at the level of the secondary rules, e.g., because of different procedural rules or rules of evidence, which may entail important divergences in legal practice.
The Importance of Legal doctrine
In the introduction we argued that the work of comparatists is basically comparable to the work of doctrinal legal writers. In order to be able to make comparisons, all research in comparative law has to start with the reconstruction of the legal landscape under consideration. A better insight into the doctrinal activity would thus be useful for comparatists.
However, legal doctrine is not only important for comparison with comparative law as a discipline, it is at least as important as a part of the research object of comparative law.
Comparatists know that it is impossible to limit oneself to statutory rules when comparing the law of two legal systems. This already proves impossible when one of the compared legal orders does not have statutory rules in the area under consideration, but only customary law or case law. Yet even as regards codified legal systems it is now generally accepted that the meaning and the scope of statutory rules may considerably change through the interpretation by judges when adjudicating the law. Having a correct view about legal regulation in some legal order means knowing its statutory rules, its court decisions, and, in some cases, its customary rules, and, as is becoming apparent, a capacity to appreciate the important differences which stem from legal culture. Actually, court decisions are the only legal source all legal orders have in common. However, as we have noted in the previous chapter a full legal system contains more than statutory law (and/or customary law) and case law. It also encompasses a legal doctrine. Legal doctrine forms an essential part of any full legal system.
It allows the development of the conceptual framework of the legal order and its legal methodology. Except for maybe a short time after an all encompassing codification, as with the Code Napoléon, legal doctrine is needed for structuring case law, statutory law, customary law. Individual cases should fit into the whole legal system. Isolated statutes should fit with the other ones. Customary rules have to be interpreted in such a way that they reach a minimum level of coherence. Structuring legal sources means interpreting them in such a way that they form together a coherent whole.
Modern legal doctrine often hides its creative work behind a fiction, such as the 'rational legislator', who is presumed to use words that have always the same meaning, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, who is presumed not to have wanted contradictory, or even incoherent legislation, nor absurd or clearly unjust results, etc.. The picture of the actual legislators is, of course, less positive. This means that legal doctrine is not just describing and reconstructing some legal reality , but rather it is also to a certain extent playing a part in the continual construction of the legal system itself, as well as portraying a certain type of legal culture, continuing a legal tradition. In the English common law it is rather the 'fiction' of historical continuity which acts as a structuring element. As Otto KAHN-FREUND has noted: "Every decision appears in the cloak of a mere application or adaptation of pre-existing principles laid down in earlier judicial pronouncements. Where historical continuity and systematic consistency are in conflict, it is the former which prevails, and it prevails even where the question at stake is the interpretation of a statute.
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The importance of legal doctrine explains why, for example, international law is considered to be 'really' law, whereas the rules of an international sports association generally are not considered to be fully 'law', although otherwise both legal orders have very similar characteristics: they both have primary rules of behaviour and secondary rules for the making and the adjudication of the law. They are internationally recognised as an autonomous (legal) order in their own right. In both cases customary rules may play an important role, and enforcement of judicial decisions may prove to be more difficult than in State legal systems.
But international law has its own legal doctrine and conceptual framework, which sports organisations, as with most non State legal systems, do not.
The task of legal doctrine
As it appears from the analysis above, the work of legal doctrine is essentially describing and systematising the law. Describing the law entails more than just reporting the legal rules, and certainly more than simply quoting the wording of legislative texts. In the first place one has to determine which legal rules are in force at the time of consideration. This is a formal problem: has a specific rule been repealed or not ? Are there additional bye-laws ? However, it is also a problem of content: is the rule under consideration compatible with a rule of a higher level in the hierarchy of legal sources ? If not, than the rule will be considered to be invalid, and thus non-existent in that legal order. But concluding that this rule is invalid is not simply a descriptive statement, it is the conclusion of an interpretation. Some may interpret the rules under consideration in another way, so that there is no incompatibility, and thus, no invalidity.
Describing the law
This shows to what extent description and interpretation of the law are interrelated. Every description of the law implies, inescapably, an interpretation of the law. This is often an unconscious interpretation, usually a (rather) generally used interpretation, and, exceptionally, a new, original interpretation. But, it is always an interpretation.
Moreover, facts do not simply exist. They are always seen, described, classified through the eyes of the legal system. No description of facts which would be independent from the legal system is possible. It is the conceptual framework of the legal system which guides any description of reality . Reality is ordered, and to a certain extent constructed on the basis of this conceptual framework. One 'sees' some other reality when the legal concepts used make a basic distinction, for instance, between 'rats' and 'non-rats'
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, compared to a legal system which distinguishes basically between 'movables' and 'non-movable things'. Using concepts like 'trust' or 'abuse of law' can order reality in a different way from that of legal systems which do not use such broad concepts. When, e.g., a politician receives money from a private company to finance his election campaign, this might be considered to be 'corruption' today, while it was a normal way of financing yesterday, and it still is in some other legal systems.
Because reality is structured in a different way, some solutions for problems appear to be possible in one legal system and not, or at least very difficult, in another legal system. Legal concepts, structures and institutions, or indeed the whole of the legal technique offered by a legal system is on one hand offering opportunities for solving problems, but on the other blocking different solutions. Both within and outside law some conceptual framework is necessary to grasp reality. Such a conceptual framework reduces the enormous complexity of reality and is necessary to make a normal life possible. On the other hand, it limits the opportunities to see things in a different way, to handle problems and to solve them. The price we pay for our freedom and our opportunities is the deliberate limitation of this freedom and these opportunities. This conceptual framework, both inside and outside the law, is only to some extent a rational construction, based on pure rational choices. Every culture, every legal system contains some historical coincidences, which make this culture or legal system somewhat less rational and/or somewhat less coherent. The English legal system is here one of the best examples of it, because of its strong, direct roots in history. All this means that any 'legal' description of facts is determined by the legal rules of some legal system and by its conceptual framework, as worked out and systematised in legal doctrine over the years. The importance of legal doctrine, as a discipline is sometimes hidden, for instance, because the work is done, not by professional academics, but by judges and other practitioners, as has been the case in the history of English law, a characteristic which arguably has held true until recently 65 . Also, as in the case of all major codifications over the last few centuries, doctrinal concepts have been taken over by the courts or by the legislator. Yet, it is not because the work of legal doctrine has been recognised and accepted in a formal way by judges and legislators that it has become less important. On the contrary, it tends to prove the importance of the doctrinal work for the development of legal systems.
The fact that the conceptual framework became, to a large extent, part of the positive law, through legislation and/or court decisions, does not diminish its importance for the description of reality, but in fact strengthens it.
Systematising the law
65
The House of Lords case of White v Jones (2 WLR 1995, 187) provides evidence of the increasing tendency of certain judges to refer to Academic doctrine (see, esp., Lord GOFF at pp.202-203). This is in marked contrast to the traditional position, no doubt still shared by some English judges where "It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I believe that every judge on the bench shares, that text books are more and more quoted in court." (KEKEWICH, J., in Union Bank v Münster, 37Law Reports. Chancery Division 1887, p.51, at p.54).
In modern legal systems, legal doctrine often is confronted with rapid changes in the law, an inflation of legislation, and fragmented, often hap-hazard changes of legal institutions or branches of the law. Moreover, the exact content of legislative rules, or of other legal sources, is, eventually, determined by the body which has the last word as regards the interpretation of the law. These are the courts, and in this case especially the supreme court, and/or the constitutional court within the legal system. The patchwork of both legislation and case law force legal doctrine to (re)systematize the law. Such a systematisation is carried out by a (re)interpretation of the differing legal rules, in the light of a coherent unity, on the basis of a number of basic concepts and principles. This indicates that there is a close link, not only between interpretation and description, but also between interpretation (of an isolated rule) and systematisation (of a set of rules). Legal doctrine is not just imposing its conceptual framework on the law, from the outside. It has to work with the concepts and words as used by the legislators and the courts. This is considered as one of the main obstacles to accurate comparative research, namely the impossibility of adopting a completely external point of view. The conceptual reconstruction of the legal materials of a legal order is always partially determined by the concepts and wordings used in those legal sources. Until now the few or limited attempts of comparative law have been unsuccesful in developing some conceptual meta-language which would allow for an external comparison. Alongside those problems of understanding and judging differences in legal culture, the development of some conceptual legal meta-language, which could cover at least two or more different legal orders, will be a necessary condition for a real development of comparative law.
On the other hand, as we have already mentioned above, legal doctrine can sometimes succeed in gaining the acceptance by legislators or courts of newly developed concepts. This means that comparative law could, in the long term, succeed in influencing the individual legal systems by making (part of) its meta-language accepted by some of these legal orders.
Such a new conceptual framework of comparative law thus could filter through into the national legal systems. In this case, the scientific, doctrinal meta-language would become the ordinary, legal language. and, in order to properly understand this area of English law, it will be necessary to include
French legal discourse. Here, we are clearly faced with comparative law as an instrument of integration.
As we have already mentioned, the mixture of cultures on our territories, today, entails a (e.g., the use of drugs, or traffic problems) to which, partly, old, inadapted legislation has to, or at least could, be applied. At last, the law, sometimes, is adapted to changed views in society.
The Methodology of Legal Doctrine
Describing the law is, we have said, inextricably bound up with interpretation. When describing the law, the doctrinal legal writer is constantly, either implicitly or explicitly, formulating hypotheses as regards the meaning of legal concepts, legal rules, legal principles or legal institutions. 74 These hypotheses are checked on the basis of materials which generally are considered to be authoritative (e.g.: established precedents, supreme court decisions, legislative materials) and by using the classical interpretation methods.
Accepting an interpretation, eventually, is not based on some 'objective' certainty, but on an inter-subjective consensus within the legal community.
However, the interpretation of (relatively isolated) rules and concepts is also influenced by the systematicity of a larger whole (a legal institution, a branch of the law or even the whole legal system). The English legal system is traditionally considered to be a case-based system, Aulis Aarnio defines a legal doctrinal theory as "a set of concepts and propositions which systematize legal norms in a certain way." (AARNIO, A., Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, Helsinki, 1983, p.216).
Legal doctrine and comparative law
Legal doctrine is the description and the systematisation of the law in one specific legal system. Comparative law is comparing such legal systems. Together with statutory law, case law and customary law, legal doctrine is an object of the comparative study. However, it is also its scientific model. Comparative law is also concerned with the description and the systemation of law, but this is from an external point of view. Taking an external position towards one's own legal system is problematic, both from a practical and an epistemological point of view. Nevertheless, the ambition of comparative law has always been to develop some neutral framework, some common language with which several legal systems could be described in a way accessible and completely understandable by lawyers belonging to anyone of those legal systems. We are not discussing here the problems it entails 81 . We merely wish to emphasise that some (relatively) neutral, objective, accessible description is a key ambition of comparative law.
However, a really common language, a common conceptual framework has still to be developed. At this point, we want to emphasise only that this new conceptual framework is to be developed at the level of systematisation, one of the two tasks of legal doctrine, and, obviously, also of comparative law.
Because legal doctrine is an important element of developed legal systems, the stage of development of legal doctrine in the different legal systems seems to be an essential stage of enquiry for comparative law.
International football associations, for example, have no legal doctrine of their own, and are, for this reason, not fully developed legal systems They borrow legal concepts, legal procedures, etc., from one or more State legal systems. Their study might be useful for comparative law, but not at the first stage. At the most they are interesting as a kind of hybrid legal system, but, unlike State legal systems, they do not offer new concepts or principles.
International public law, on the other hand, might demonstrate deficiencies as regards its effectiveness -and obviously much more than it is the case with international sports associations -but it has a developed legal doctrine. For this reason, as we already noted above, it is a more developed legal system, when compared to the legal systems of, e.g., 81 See, on the problem of a common language in comparative law: VAN sports associations, and more interesting from the point of view of comparative law.
The Common Law, when compared to Continental legal systems, offers a perceivably less developed legal doctrine. The prevailing tradition draws upon case to case reasoning, with a notable reluctance towards systematisation and general principles. Common lawyers have remained at the stage of induction, whereas the civil law systems combine both induction and deduction. In this sense, current English law is closer to Roman law than to current civil law.
As SAMUEL has noted:
"If the history of science is one of a tension between the concrete and the abstract as Blanché claims, and that induction and deduction mark the two steps in the development of scientific thinking, then the reason why there appears to be an inner relationship between Classical Roman and English law is that the two remain in the same scientific stage of development. Roman Classical law and modern common law are both inductive in their method. " At a second level, comparative law in the more traditional, strict sense is possible within each of the large cultural families. This comparison should start from the basic elements which form the hard core, the paradigm of every legal system. These paradigmatical elements can be structured around six areas: the conception of law, the theory of valid legal sources, the methodology of law, the theory of argumentation, the theory of legitimation of the law, the generally accepted basic ideological values and principles.
At a third level a more or less purely technical comparison is possible when comparing legal systems having the same paradigmatical theories in each of those six areas, as is the case with the continental Member States of the European Union. Here, concrete comparison of statutory and judicial rules of behaviour can be fruitful, because the context, the legal culture is very similar, so that often only minor sociological, historical, economic or ideological elements have to be taken into account, whereas also the conceptual framework and legal language are to a large extent the same.
At each of these three levels comparative law may be employed in a more involved, active way by using it as an 'instrument of integration'. This is the case in non-Western legal cultures where Western law has been imported and to a certain extent integrated into the domestic legal system and legal culture.
But the currently most fascinating place where comparative law is being used as an instrument of integration is the European Union. One should not deny the influence of the emergence of the supranational, as a key development that comparatists must come to terms with, as such modern legal structures are a driving force leading to such noticable 'intersystematicity'. This means a constant interaction between legal doctrine of two or more legal systems, mutually influencing each other. This is currently the case in the supranational structure that is the European Union, and most notably in the European courts and with regard to European directives. Of course, some unilateral influence by one legal system on another, is not new at all, but rather a constant element in legal history over all time. New in this European development is that lawyers are forced to take this 'intersystemic' approach.
Within European jurisdictions judges from all Member States have to develop some common legal language. They are constantly confronted with differing reasonings and conceptual frameworks, which they have, to a certain extent, to integrate into their own legal language.
A new, common European legal language is slowly developing. When comparing legal systems within the 'law as culture' approach, it appears that shared ideological viewpoints, both at the second (intra-cultural) and the third level (intra-familial),
play an essential role and may influence largely the other paradigmatical elements. In the long term they may change some paradigmatical theories (e.g. by accepting 'unwritten general legal principles' as a new source of law), while in the short term they may influence the way they are interpreted and applied in practice (e.g. a more active role for the judge, or more emphasis on teleological interpretation rather than a literal construction of statutes).
Common basic ideology thus forms a kind of deep level within a legal culture, whereas the other paradigmatical theories form the intermediate level. The concrete rules within the legal system are then to be located at the surface level: it is the rules of behaviour, the legal concepts, and the secondary rules of change and adjudication of the law as far as they are not included in the paradigmatical hard core of a legal system. These elements of legal technique at the surface level do not actually play an important role in determining differences and similarities between the solutions a court might give to a case. But they will, of course, strongly influence the wording of the decision and the justification given to the legal solution.
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Differences in legal culture, and in conceptual frameworks entail fundamental problems for the establishment of a common legal language for comparative law. On one hand, such a common language is needed if comparative law aims at becoming a genuine and international discipline, and not a strand of private international law, in which every legal system has its own private international law system, and only a very limited internationally common language. It is needed if one wants to avoid a sheer juxtaposition of legal languages and legal systems.
On the other hand, language is such an essential part of culture, that it seems very difficult to perfectly understand and master a foreign legal language. As it is, to a certain extent, language which creates reality, a different legal language produces another kind of 'legal reality'. In this sense the 'functional approach', as advocated by ZWEIGERT and KÖTZ, suggests something which is not possible: a legally neutral approach to reality. There is no 'legal reality' outside law. In order to grasp this legal reality one has to learn the legal language of the foreign legal system, or to develop some new common legal language. This, however, cannot but change reality, as is shown by the introduction of the western concept of human rights in almost all non-western countries, or from the developments within the European Union, where there is some dialectical interaction between national legal systems and European law.
A common legal language can be built in two ways: an internationally common scientific meta-language (transdisciplinarity), which uses existing common concepts and elements and/or develops new ones; or a constant exchange of concepts and viewpoints between legal systems (interdisciplinarity), as it is already to some extent the case amongst legal systems within the European Union.
The traditional distinction of three 'legal families': the 'Romano-Germanic family', 'the Common Law family' and the 'Socialist family' did not take into account the fundamental differences amongst the four large cultural families in the world. For example, it arguably divided African legal systems according to their colonial history, through which they became part of the family of the colonising state, and not by virtue of their, much older and much more influential, own cultural history. Moreover, this traditional distinction was confusing two different criteria: legal technique and conceptual framework on one hand, and ideology on the other. At the level of legal technique there remains, today, only the distinction (within the Western legal culture) between Romano-Germanic and Common Law families, although there appears to remain no more paradigmatical differences between both 'families' as far as the EU legal systems are concerned. At the level of ideology, within Western legal culture, there seem to be no differences which are, nowadays, structurally dividing or linking some of its legal systems. Within Europe, the main ideological opposition, between 'socialist' and 'capitalist' legal systems, disappeared.
All this highlights the point that comparative law is in need of a new model for structuring groups or 'families' of legal systems. What has been developed in this article could serve as a starting point for such a new model.
In general, comparative research needs to be under-taken with the three outlined concepts of law in mind: 'law as culture', 'law as rules' and 'law as an integrative instrument'.
We repeat that when distinguishing differing 'legal cultures' or 'legal families' a first division should be made in four large cultural families, African, Asian, Islamic and Western.
A second division within each of these cultural families could be made on the basis of paradigmatical similarities and differences. These paradigmatical elements can be divided At last, one could distinguish between legal concepts, rules and institutions as 'rational choices', on the one hand, and as 'coincidences', on the other. Especially when using comparative law as an instrument of integration, this distinction may be helpful to choose between two differing legal concepts, rules or institutions.
Here, obviously, an interdisciplinary approach will be needed. Especially useful in this matter could be legal history (for understanding how such legal elements came to birth or evolved accidentally or rationally) and economic analysis of law (for making a rational choice amongst differing concepts, rules or institutions).
But also more generally comparative law is, by definition, an interdisciplinary endeavour. In a 'law as culture' approach anthropology and sociology of law are always present, be it directly or in the background. Depending on the chosen topic and approach all other 'metajuridical' disciplines may come into play.
Eventually, every attempt to distinguish 'legal cultures' or 'legal families' is to a certain
